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Models of the Nucleus:  Incompatible Things, Compatible Processes 
William A. Penn 
Nuclear models are incompatible in their thing-terms:  terms that refer to static entities like 
objects, structures, and substances.  Specifically, the two most prevalent models—the liquid drop 
and shell models—treat the nucleus, its internal structure, and the component nucleons as entities 
that contradict each other’s properties.  These differences allow these two models to describe and 
explain different nuclear experiments: fission and scattering in the liquid drop model, and 
single-nucleon excitation and nuclear decay in the shell model.  However, prima facie, these 
differences also suggest that these models are incompatible in their ontology.  However, by 
taking seriously the experimental methods by which these models are constructed and the 
calculational tools these models provide for interpreting experimental outcomes, I construct a 
new form of realism about these models that renders them ontologically compatible.  Namely, I 
argue that nuclear models are consistent in the dynamic entities to which they refer.  I therefore 
advocate a pure process realism with respect to nuclear models.  Critical to this process realism 
is the recognition that the processes referred to within nuclear models are essential parts of the 
observation acts that form nuclear experiments.  In particular, because the dynamics within the 
nucleus must always be a continuous intermediary of our experimental interventions and the 
receptions of signals from the system, these dynamics are essential dynamic parts of nuclear 
experiments.  We are therefore licensed in inferring these dynamic parts on the basis of 
experimental practice alone.  In contrast, the thing terms reified by the thing realist in these 
models require additional inferences, the premises of which cannot be supported on the basis of 
experiment alone.  Thus, inferences to processes are experimentally supportable, whereas 
inferences to things are dubious at best.  
 
 








[1]:  Introduction 
Nuclear models are incompatible in their thing-terms:  terms that refer to static entities 
like objects, structures, and substances (Boniolo et. al. 2002, Teller 2004, Morrison 2011, 
Portides 2011).  Specifically, the two most prevalent models—the liquid drop and shell 
models—treat the nucleus, its internal structure, and the component nucleons as entities with 
contradictory properties.  These differences allow these two models to describe and explain 
different nuclear phenomena: fission and neutron-scattering in the liquid drop model, and 
single-nucleon excitation and nuclear decay in the shell model.  However, prima facie, these 
differences also suggest that these models are incompatible in their ontology.  Indeed, by 
maintaining an adherence to standard static ontologies of objects, structures, and substances, 
henceforth “thing realism,”  this incompatibility is irresolvable.  Any success of their 1
explanations comes not from the entities, properties, and structures they posit but from 
somewhere else.  
This presents two problems.  First, there is an ontological problem with this 
incompatibility:  to what are we referring to when we use the term “the nucleus”?  Second, there 
is an explanatory problem:  how can we reasonably use one set of features of the nucleus to 
explain successfully if those features are incompatible with equally explanatory features of a 
different model?  The explanatory problem is built on top of the ontological problem.  The 
ontological problem suggests that the explanations offered by, e.g., the liquid drop model are 
reliant on entities that ​cannot​ exist, meaning that the explanations are akin to explaining the 
functioning of a computer with square circles.  In other words, the incompatibility of these 
1 ​Examples of thing realism abound.  See Wiggns (2016a, b, c) for an example of a mixed ontology that treats 
substance as the continuant of an active principle.  
 
models is more than the result of attributing different features to a single system:  each model 
denies the possibility of the (thing) ontology offered by the other.  
However, this is only a problem with a thing-interpretation of these models.  By taking 
seriously the experimental methods by which these models are constructed and the calculational 
tools these models provide for interpreting experimental outcomes, I construct a new form of 
realism about these models that renders them ontologically compatible.  Namely, I argue that 
nuclear models are consistent in the dynamic entities to which they refer:  the interactions of 
nucleons, the excitations of the aggregate whole and its parts, the decay processes the system 
undergoes, and, in general, the processes of the nuclear system.  Here “process” is a primitive 
term used to refer to the sort of entity exemplified by motions, interactions, excitations, growths, 
decays, etc.   Similar to recent work by other authors in the philosophy of science (Dupre 2010, 2
2018; Earley 2003, 2008; Kaiser 2018; Guay and Pradeu (forthcoming); Guay and Sartenear 
2018), I therefore advocate a pure process realism with respect to nuclear models:  we should 
reify these dynamics without reifying the objects, structures, and static properties that are 
demonstrably incompatible.  By doing so, I argue that both the liquid drop and shell models are 
fully compatible and successfully explanatory.  The nucleus, therefore, is no more than a 
collection of processes.   3
2 ​I use the word “process” in much the same way as Seibt (1990, 2004, 2005, 2018) uses the word “dynamics.” 
Importantly, it is a primitive term and cannot be defined independently.  However, as I have suggested here, it is 
possible to build a working definition of process from various paradigmatic examples.  Motions, interactions, 
decays, excitations, growths, etc. are all paradigmatic processes.   Penn (“Introduction to Process Realism” 
manuscript) provides a brief explanation of these paradigms with the interest of building a working concept for the 
primitive process.   See also Pemberton (2018), Griesemer (2018), Love (2018), and Chen (2018)  for more on 
constructing a working definition of process within scientific theory (specifically biology).  
3 ​Similar claims have been made about other systems.  For example, Penn (“The Processes of the Candle Flame” 
manuscript) and Penn (“Reimagining Perrin’s Robustness Argument” manuscript), has been argued that thermal 
systems like the candle flame are explained and investigated solely with processes, and that any apparent reference 
to or inference of things is better described historically and physically as a reference/inference of processes.  Penn 
“Are we Justified in Inferring the Existence of Dark Matter?” manuscript) argues for a similar conclusion about 
 
Critical to this process realism is the recognition that the processes referred to within 
nuclear models are essential parts of the observational acts that form nuclear experiments.  In 
particular, because the dynamics within the nucleus must always be a continuous intermediary of 
our experimental interventions and the reception of signals from the system, these dynamics are 
essential dynamic parts of nuclear experiments.  We are therefore licensed in inferring these 
dynamic parts on the basis of experimental practice alone.  In contrast, the thing terms reified by 
the thing realist in these models require additional inferences, the premises of which cannot be 
supported on the basis of experiment alone.  The essential premise of these additional inferences 
is one of two options (a) that all dynamics (metaphysically) require static things to underlie them,
 or (b) that the existence of stability in an experimental system necessitates something static and 4
unchanging within the system.   These premises are question-begging if deductively supported, 5
and insufficient if inductively supported.  Thus, inferences to processes are experimentally 
supportable, whereas inferences to things are dubious at best.   Process realism is therefore 6
superior to thing realism in the context of nuclear models because it:  
(1) establishes cross-model consistency,  
(2) accords with experimental practice and explanations, and  
cosmological material entities.  Parr et. al. (2005) and Bader (1999, 2008) problematize the molecular system in a 
similar way.  Hattema (2007) describes some of the problems in the history of molecular modeling, e.g., the Heitler 
and London (1927) and the Hund (1927) models of the molecule.  Earley (2003, 2008) argues explicitly for a 
“process structural realism” about the molecule that is quite similar to what I articulate here.  The largest difference 
is that Earley is willing to reify structures within the molecule, while I take this as impossible given that structures in 
the nucleus are a part of the incompatibility of nuclear models.  
4 ​This is a claim that dates back to Aristotle.  See ​Physics​ 190a31-b9.  Penn (“Processes Underlie Processes” 
manuscript) shows that this claim begs the question.  Seibt (1990) also criticizes this premise extensively.  
5 ​Penn (“Processes Underlie Processes” manuscript) shows that this argument cannot rule out that processes, not 
things, underlie processes and stabilities.  Penn (“The Processes of the Candle Flame” manuscript) provides an 
example of how we explain stabilities in terms of processes.  Penn (“Reimagining Perrin’s Robustness Argument” 
manuscript) provides an in-depth example of this argument, and shows that the argument actually rules in favor of 
process undeliers.  
6 ​This has been argued extensively in Penn (“Processes Underlie Processes” manuscript).  
 
(3) is epistemically modest.  
We begin in section 2 with a brief introduction to the liquid drop and the shell models of 
the nucleus.  In addition to the normal exegesis, I will also show how these models are 
ontologically incompatible on any form of thing realism (object, structural, substantial, 
bundle-theoretic, etc.).  In section 3, we turn to reinterpreting the material and formal features of 
the nucleus in terms of dynamic entities (motions, excitations, etc.).  In discussing the formal and 
material features meant to support the haeccity of the nucleus, I offer the standard process realist 
arguments that these features are no more than real dynamics with the added knowledge that they 
cannot be reinterpreted as things in any sense.  I then show that the explanations of the nuclear 
models rest on these dynamics, and that these dynamics are compatible.  Their compatibility is 
the result of both models acknowledging the existence of all processes, but only using a subset of 
these processes in order to explain the salient behaviors of the nucleus.  
 
[2]:  Many Models, Divergent Things 
There are many models of nuclear systems corresponding to many phenomena.   Liquid 7
drop models, developed in the 1930’s, are still used to model the fission of a nucleus.  Shell 
models, similar to molecular and atomic orbital models, are used to model nuclear line spectra, 
and to a lesser extent the stability of the nucleus.  Lattice models are used to understand nucleus 
formation and structural binding stabilities.  For our purposes here, we will consider only liquid 
drop and shell models.  Considering these two will be quite sufficient to establish that no 
7 ​See Cook (2006) for an overview of the various types.  One type not discussed by Cook, more recently developed, 
is the so-called unified lattice model.  See Caurier et. al. (2005).  It is worth noting that this model is not a 
unification of the liquid drop and shell models.  The hope is that the model will be able to unify explanations of 
nuclear decay and of scattering experiments, but the model cannot explain fission.  It is still unclear that the model 
can explain spectral emission.  
 
robustness argument—an argument that terms in these models refer to real things in virtue of 
their appearance and similarity in both (and more) models —can be made for the reality of things 8
in the nucleus, or for the nucleus qua thing itself.  Insofar as “the nucleus,” “nucleons,” “Energy 
structure,” etc. appear as identical terms in models of nuclear systems meant to refer to a static 
thing, the terms are wildly divergent in meaning.  The models therefore contain no robust 
thing-terms.  
 
[2.1]:  The Liquid Drop Model 
The liquid-drop model treats the nucleus as a drop of incompressible fluid of similar 
shape and structure to a drop of water.  This analogy facilitates a highly accurate account of the 
nuclear binding energy and of how nucleons act together to produce collective, nucleus-wide 
motions such as fission.  The model achieved its success primarily through this description of 
fission given by Meitner and Frisch (1939).  9
In a drop of liquid, molecules will meaningfully interact only with their 
nearest-neighbors.  For example, water molecules in a drop of water will electrostatically repel 
and attract each other and undergo collisions brought about by the momenta and thermodynamic 
vibrations of the molecules. Each of these interactions is between exactly two molecules, and the 
interactions are only significant when these molecules are sufficiently close to each other.  The 
liquid-drop model of the nucleus imports near-exactly this reasoning to nucleon-nucleon 
interactions.  The model assumes that there is a strong attractive potential, built from pairwise 
8 ​Penn (“Processes Underlie Processes” manuscript) and Penn (“Reimagining Perrin’s Argument” manuscript) offer 
in depth discussions of robustness arguments in general and in a particular historical case study respectively.  Both 
are written in the context of a discussion of process realism and thing realism. 
9 ​For a fully detailed explanation of the history of this model, see Stuewer (1994).  See Gamow (1929) for the first 
liquid-drop model.  See Cook (2006, ch. 4) for a detailed introduction to the liquid-drop model.  
 
interactions between nearest-neighbor nucleons, binding the nucleus together, as well as 
electrostatic repulsion between nearest-neighbor nucleons that prevents collapse.  
This assumption entails a difference in binding energy between particles at the surface 
and particles within the volume of the liquid-drop.  Particles at the surface will always have 
fewer neighbors than particles within the volume.  Thus, particles at the surface of the drop will 
be much more weakly bound than particles in the interior of the drop.  This means that the 
binding energy of the liquid-drop is expressed by the following proportionality (k​1​ and k​2​ are real 
constants, mere proportions): 
Eq. 1) E (number of  particles) (number of  particles)( binding ≈ k1 − k2
2/3  
As the number of 
particles increases, the 
first term—the volume 
term—begins to 
dominate the second 
term—the surface term. 
Thus larger drops are 
less stable, since they 
have lower binding 
energy.   Following this 10
analogy, the nucleus 
10 Note that by convention, binding energy is considered large when it is a large negative number.  
 
therefore exhibits similar behavior to that given by equation 1.  
Additional pairwise interactions are added to this nuclear model to provide further 
accuracy to the theoretically predicted binding energy (figure 1).  First, one recognizes that 
protons will repel each other.  Therefore an additional repulsive term is added to the 
proportionality of equation 1.  Second, empirically motivated terms are added recognizing that 
nuclei with an even number of nucleons have higher binding energy (pairing), and recognizing 
that nuclei with an equal number of neutrons and protons tend to have higher binding energy 
(asymmetry).  These are collected in the Weizsäcker mass-energy equation: 
Eq. 2) BE(Z, A) A A Z(Z ) hell correction terms(  = k1 + k2
2/3 + k3 − 1 + k4 A
(A−2Z)2 + k5 1A1/2 + s  
 
 
Figure 2 shows the relative effects of each term in moving the theoretical binding energy curve 
closer to the observed binding energy curve.   11
With all of these terms accounted for, the liquid-drop model is able to explain vibrational 
and oscillatory resonances of the whole nucleus.  Any disturbance in the nucleus as a whole will 
be the result of many interactions between neighboring nucleons.  For example, if a nucleus is 
struck by a low-energy bombarding neutron, this neutron’s energy will distribute throughout the 
nucleus through the nearest-neighbor interactions depicted in figure 1.  Impacted nucleons will 
similarly interact, causing the nucleus as a whole to enter a higher energy state.  The nucleus will 
redistribute the energy of the bombarding neutron among its nucleons until this energy is 
released through nucleon emission or fission.  
 
[2.2]:  The Shell Model 
While the liquid-drop model is concerned with analyzing the behavior of collections of 
particles, the shell model considers the behavior of an individual nucleon.  The model seeks to 
explain only the behavior of this individual nucleon and treats all other nucleons as equivalent to 
an external Fermi field to which this nucleon couples.  The nucleon is therefore treated as if it 
were part of a diffuse Fermi gas, much like the electrons bound in an atom.  This facilitates a 
description of how an individual nucleon can occupy and transition between energy states within 
the nucleus.  This in turn allows the model to explain the special stability of nuclei with certain 
numbers of nucleons:  the so-called magic numbers.   12
11 See Weizsäcker (1935) for the full mathematical treatment of these terms.  
12 ​The first shell model is presented by Mayer and jensen (1955).  For a modern introduction to the model, see Cook 
(2006, ch. 2).  
 
Two facts are suggestive of nuclear energy shell-structure.  First, an individual nucleon 
will not collide with other nucleons very frequently.  Were such collisions to occur, nuclei would 
be far less stable in various decay processes than observational data suggests.  Second, for an 
individual nucleon, the forces acting on it from the other nucleons can be amalgamated into a 
single quantum potential well to which the nucleon couples—a Fermi field.  Thus, the nucleon 
will enter quantized energy levels, the structure of which will depend on the shape of the 
potential well imposed on the individual nucleon.  These facts entail that nucleons occupy 
non-coinciding trajectories within the nucleus.  Given that nucleons experience strong attractive 
forces which would otherwise bring them into collisions, this in turn suggests that nucleon 
trajectories are kept apart by something like the Pauli-exclusion principle.  In analogy with the 
case of electron orbits in an atom, nucleons are unable to occupy the same trajectories, instead 
occupying discrete trajectories quantized by the total angular momentum and energy of the 
nucleon occupying that trajectory.  
The applicability of the Pauli exclusion principle for nucleons facilitates a direct 
comparison of nuclear structure to atomic structure:  the nucleus can be treated like an electron 
cloud in an atom.  Electrons moving in an atom move in orbits—orbits that are separated from 
each other by Pauli exclusion—defined by a central, attractive potential well.  Each electron 
occupies the lowest-energy orbital that is not already filled by another electron, and orbits are 
quantized in terms of the net energy, angular momentum, and spin of the occupying electron. 
Similarly, nucleons in the shell model occupy energy levels—”orbits” or “energy shells”—which 
are defined by something like the harmonic oscillator potential well.  The energy levels 
associated with coupling the nucleon to such a harmonic potential well are depicted in figure 3 
 
(left hand lines).  Two nucleons, like electrons in the atom, are incapable of occupying the same 
energy level in virtue of Pauli exclusion.  Finally, having defined nucleon “orbits,” one 
introduces a spin-orbit coupling for the orbiting nucleon.  This splits the energy level into 
sublevels defined by the total angular momentum of the nucleon, as depicted in figure 3 (right 
hand lines).  Just like electrons in an atom, nucleons will occupy the lowest available energy 
level that is not already occupied by another nucleon, and nucleons will transition between two 
levels only when individually excited with the discrete energy corresponding to the difference in 
energy between the two levels.  
 
This provides the basis for explaining the magic numbers.  Atoms with filled energy 
shells exhibit much greater stability than atoms with open energy shells, called shell closure. 
This is why noble gas elements like Helium and Neon are far less reactive than elements like 
those in the alkali group, e.g., Lithium and Sodium.  Helium and Neon have “magic numbers” of 
electrons—2 and 10—which correspond to the number of electrons needed to fill the lowest 
energy levels.  Similarly, nuclei which fill all the subshells in a given energy shell will 
experience shell closure, and be much more stable.  Shell closure occurs when a nucleus has 2, 8, 
20, etc. nucleons of either type.  
 
[2.3]:  Incompatibility 
We now ask:  are these two models describing the same thing?  The answer is that they 
are not.  The nucleus of the liquid drop model is quite different from that of the shell model.  The 
two models of “the nucleus” describe the nucleus as having a different shape, different internal 
structure (e.g., definable spatial relations between nucleons), different spatial extent and density, 
and different analogous material constitution.  This is summarized in table 1.  




Shell Model Claims: Experimental Results 
Support:  
Entity Claim: The nucleus is a 
liquid-drop 
The nucleus is a 
Fermi gas 
neither 
Presence of internal 
structure: 
There is no internal 
structure 
There is internal 
structure 
both 
Shape of the nucleus: Roughly spherical, 
varying directly with 
nucleon number 
Roughly spherical, 
not varying directly 
with nucleon number 
Liquid-drop 
 
Table 1:​  A comparison of properties and thing-claims made by the liquid drop and shell models. 
 
First, the liquid-drop and shell models directly contradict each other on the presence of 
internal nuclear structure.  The liquid-drop model admits only a nuclear surface and interior.  In 
contrast, shell models predicts energy shells and subshells, and therefore admit rich internal 
substructure.  Thus the liquid-drop model depicts a nucleus with ​no​ internal structure, and the 
shell model depicts a nucleus with ​much​ internal structure.  
The two models also conflict over the size and shape of the nucleus.  The liquid-drop 
predicts an approximately spherical shape for the nucleus resulting from nearest-neighbor 
attractive interactions between the nucleons.  This in turn means that the liquid-drop predicts a 
sharp drop in nucleon density as one approaches the boundary of the nucleus.  There are 
few-to-no nucleons that exist outside of the nuclear radius.  The nucleus, according to the 
liquid-drop model, has a definite shape and size related to the number of nucleons A;  the 
nucleus is a spheroid of radius proportional to A​1/3​.  
In contrast, the shell model predicts that the size and shape of the nucleus depends on the 
shape and closure of energy shells.  This is because nuclear structure in the shell model is almost 
entirely dependent on the texture of these shells.  The nuclear radius will therefore depend on 
Density of the 
nucleus: 
Constant, with a 
sharp drop at the 
nuclear radius 
Varying, with a 
gradual drop at the 
nuclear radius 
Shell  
Radius of the 
nucleus: 
Proportional to A​1/3 Proportional to 
occupation numbers 




occupation number, not A​1/3​.  In addition, the density of nucleons will vary radically between 
nuclei with magic numbers of nucleons and nuclei without magic numbers of nuclei, again 
because energy shell structure determines nuclear structure.  These features are depicted 
schematically in figure 4.  
Finally, the 
energy shell structure of 
the nucleus also entails 
that nuclear density 
varies continuously with 
increasing radius. 
Rather than a constant 
density as in the 
liquid-drop model, the 
shell model predicts that the tendency of energy shells to spatially separate will cause nucleon 
density to be inconstant, especially in nuclei with open energy shells.  
Empirical data do not strictly rule in favor of either model.  Rather, both models 
experience some success in their explanations, and failure in others.  The liquid-drop model 
successfully explains the nuclear radius but not the nuclear density.  Fission experiments and 
neutron bombardment indicate that there is little internal shell structure in the nucleus, 
supporting the liquid-drop, while scattering experiments and observations of radioactive decay 
suggest the rich internal structure of the shell model.  The models are therefore directly 
contradictory in a thing ontology, with no apparent way of adjudicating between them.  It is no 
 
wonder, then, that many authors advocate not only that these models are incompatible, but that 
we should remain silent on, or else eliminate, thing realist intuitions about the nucleus on the 
basis of these models (Boniolo et. al. 2002; Teller 2004; Morrison 2011; Portides 2011).  13
 
[3]:  The Features of the Nucleus are Processes 
The liquid drop and shell models are contradictory in their thing terms.  Therefore, these 
thing terms cannot be robust.  However, Penn (“Processes Underlie Processes” manuscript) has 
argued that this is not special.  Indeed, we expect that processes are robust where things are not. 
To see this in the nuclear case, we return to our list of features of the nucleus.  These are: 
Table 2:​  A list of formal, material, and productive features of the nucleus to be explained.  
 
Importantly, the features of the nucleus that are of most interest are the formal and productive 
features.  These are, at minimum, the features of the nuclear system that models of the nucleus 
are supposed to explain.  We saw this in section 2:  the liquid drop model can successfully 
13 ​Cook (2006) also remarks that the models make inconsistent claims.  See also Bohr and Mottelson (1969) for an 
in-depth, historical account of the tension between these models.  
Type Features:  Formal Features Material Features Productive Features 
Token Features: -The shape of the 
nucleus 
 
-The internal energy 
spectrum structure 
 
-The radius of the 
nucleus 
 
-The density of the 
nucleus 
-The composition of 
the nucleus in terms 
of protons and 
neutrons.  
 
-The composition of 
decay products 
produced by nuclear 
radioactive decay.  










explain the shape and size of the nucleus, and the shell model can successfully explain its 
internal energy structure.  
However, there is an important distinction we must draw:  the formal features are not, 
strictly speaking, the explananda of nuclear models.  The liquid drop and shell models are not 
used in experimental settings, both historical and contemporary, to explain these formal features. 
Rather, they are used to explain the processual features of the nuclear system:  fission, 
radioactive decay, spectral emission, neutron capture and scattering, etc.  These are the 
phenomena that are actually modeled and occur in experimental settings.  The formal features of 
the nuclear system are therefore explananda only insofar as we might already have thing-realist 
intuitions.  
Moreover, I have already shown how the formal features of the nucleus according to the 
two models are incompatible.  Therefore, these formal features cannot be explanans either. 
Rather, I show below that the formal features of the nucleus are placeholder terms for collections 
of processes, useful only for their pragmatic role in describing the evolution and dynamics of 
interest in the nuclear system.  Importantly, this is not an a priori argument, but rather follows 
simply from the facts of the models and their history.  The models were designed to explain 
dynamics, and use dynamics to do this explaining.  This is the explanatory defeat of things: 
processes do all of the explaining in these models, and are the entities being explained.  
In turn, the material features are offered as the thing-realist’s hope of an explanans 
independent of these formal features.  Surely, the argument goes, the material composition of the 
nucleus plays a role in explaining nuclear phenomena simply because nucleons are the bearers of 
properties and vehicles of processes in the nucleus.  As I will articulate, this argument, just like 
 
the underlier arguments rejected in Penn (“Processes Underlie Processes” manuscript), fails 
because it does not rule out that the nucleons are themselves processes or collections thereof.  
However, just like with the formal features, the incompatibility of nuclear models on 
thing-realist interpretations makes it difficult to see how appeal to thing-nucleons is meant to 
resolve anything.  Given that these nucleons have to be fit into incompatible models as 
explanatory elements, they will inevitably inherit that incompatibility.  For example, if nucleons 
are meant to both occupy discrete energy shells and not occupy these shells, the nucleons 
themselves will need to have a property  “energy within the nuclear system” that is one value in 14
the liquid drop model and another in the shell model.  
This means that things are defeated ontologically as well.  No thing term may be reified 
in both of these models on pain of contradiction, and no thing term may be thought to explain in 
either of these models.  Instead, as I show below, all we need are processes.  Processes are 
explanans, explananda, and ontological ground in both models.  Moreover, the processes of each 
model are compatible with each other.  I turn now to a re-analysis of the features of the nuclear 
system, in order to show this.  
 
[3.1]:  Formal Features of the Nucleus:  Balanced Dynamics 
For the sake of simplicity, let us consider only two formal features of the nucleus:  the 
shape of the nucleus and the internal structure of its energy spectrum.  We use the liquid drop 
model to explain the former, whereas we use the shell model to explain the latter.  Moreover, the 
two models provide correct explanations for their respective features of the nuclear system, but 
14 ​Note that the property need not be basic or fundamental, but will need to be constructible in order for the thing 
realist to reify the nucleon.  
 
fail to explain the other feature.  Naïvely, this suggests that, even independently of the 
incompatibility of the thing interpretation of the two models, these two models cannot find 
common ground.  As we will see, the processes used to explain these two features are indeed 
common ground between the models:  the models do not contradict in their process realist 
interpretation.  
 
[3.1.1]:  The Shape of the Nucleus 
The shape of the nucleus is explained by the liquid drop model.  This explanation is 
simple:  the shape of the nucleus is the result of all of the inter-nucleon interactions (as 
catalogued by the Weizsäcker mass-energy equation) being balanced against each other to 
minimize the total energy of the nuclear system.  In other words, the electromagnetic and 
chromodynamic interactions, both represented as simple modifiers on the strength of each term 
in the Weizsäcker mass-energy equation, counteract each other to bring about a stable 
configuration of the system.  In other words, the shape of the nucleus is not some static feature of 
the nucleus, but is rather the result of a balance of multiple dynamics within the system.  This 
matches other discussions of structures in chemistry (Earley 2003, 2008) and physics 
(Finkelstein 1996, 2003; Penn “The Processes of the Candle Flame” manuscript) 
However, it is far more interesting to note how the shape of the nucleus plays a role in the 
explanation of fission.  Data on neutron bombardment of nuclei puzzled physicists in the 1930’s 
(Stuewer 1994).  The best theories of the nucleus predicted that for low-energy neutrons, neutron 
capture should be as likely as scattering from the nucleus.  However, experimental results 
showed that neutron capture was much more likely.  In addition, data showed that for each 
 
element, neutrons with certain energies were absorbed at higher rates.  This too disagreed with 
the current theories of the nucleus.  15
Bohr’s compound nucleus provided the solution to these problems.  Bohr analyzed the 
process of neutron bombardment into several distinct stages.  First, an incident neutron impacts 
the nucleus.  Second, the nucleus absorbs the neutron, and the neutron’s energy is distributed 
among the nucleons in nearest-neighbor interactions.  Then, if enough energy is collected into a 
single nucleon, that nucleon is ejected from the nucleus.   However, if there is not enough 16
energy to eject a single nucleon, the nucleus captures the incident neutron.  The energy required 
to eject neutrons from a nucleus of a given element depends upon the particular binding energy 
of that nucleus.  Thus, only neutrons with particular energies will be able to “scatter” by being 
ejected from the nucleus:  a compound nucleus with captured neutron is more likely to form if 
the energy of the incident neutron is enough to excite the nucleus into the next highest energy 
level of the nucleus as a whole.  This effect, which Bohr (1936, 344) called “resonance 
excitation” explains why neutron capture is more likely than scattering, and why certain neutron 
energies produce peak capture or peak scattering.  Here, resonance is taken literally, unlike in 
discussions of molecular resonance.  Bohr is literally describing the nucleus as resonating, i.e., 
vibrating with harmonics in tune with the incident energy of the bombarding neutron.  When 
resonant, the nucleus enters a standing wave oscillation pattern.  It is these standing wave 
oscillation patterns that constitute the energy levels of the nuclear system, just like the standing 
waves of a string on a cello.  
15 See Pais (1981, 336-337) for more on this historical difficulty.  
16 See Bohr (1937, 163) for this exact account, with explicit reference to both processes and stages (intermediate 
states) of a process.  See also Bohr (1936).  
 
This explanation was later extended to include the emission of larger clusters of nucleons 
by Meitner and Frisch (1939).   Instead of emitting only a single nucleon when in an excited 17
state, Meitner and Frisch proposed that oscillations of a compound nucleus split that nucleus into 
two smaller nuclei through the same process as Bohr describes.  This is depicted schematically 
below, in figure 5. 
These oscillations of the nuclear system are oscillations in the shape of the nucleus. 
However, these oscillations are the result of a disturbance of the balance of strong and 
electromagnetic interactions.  When we bombard the nucleus with a neutron (our intervention), 
this bombardment produces a change in the system:  the emission of two or more fission 
17 See Stuewer (1994, 107-116) for a full account of the historical development of the liquid-drop account of fission 
offered by Meitner and Frisch.  See also Frisch (1939) and Meitner (1936).  
 
products.  We observe that the fission products have a characteristic kinetic energy.  We 
therefore infer that this kinetic energy—the motion of the fission products—must have been 
acquired through some redistribution process within the original nuclear system.  We therefore 
infer, following Bohr, that this redistribution of motion within the nuclear system is the result of 
a series of interactions, first between the nuclear system and the bombarding neutron, then 
between nearest-neighbor nucleons.  We then represent this redistribution as a collective motion 
of the nuclear system, effectively averaging over the many individual interactions to produce the 
oscillations of the nuclear system.  It is at this point that we represent this collective motion as an 
oscillation in the shape of the nucleus.  Such a representation is good because the shape of the 
nucleus acts as an effective placeholder for the balance of processes within the nuclear system. 
E.g., when the nucleus has a “spherical” shape, the processes are perfectly balanced and 
therefore the system is stable.  However, when the nucleus has an “oblong” shape, the processes 
are ​imbalanced​, and the system is unstable.  By describing fission as the result of oscillations in 
this shape from spherical to oblong, we thereby show how the nuclear system dynamically 
reaches the point of instability at which fission occurs.  
Crucially, the shape of the nucleus is acting as a placeholder term in this explanation. 
Namely, it is a placeholder for the balance of many sub-nuclear interactions and motions.  When 
we want to describe these interactions and motions in aggregate, shape becomes a relevant 
feature of the system.  However, “shape” is only relevant when it itself is dynamic.  I.e., even 
when we are making use of “shape” in our explanations, we are implicitly referring to the 
underlying interactions and motions of the nuclear system.  
 
Moreover, the shape is only ever inferred, never observed.  Rather, what we observe is 
the dynamic change of the nuclear system from stable to unstable that results from our dynamic 
intervention.  Since we ​already​ associated the shape of the system with the stability produced by 
balanced internal interactions, we describe this dynamic change from a stable to unstable nuclear 
system in terms of the shape of the system.  
 
[3.1.2]:  Internal Energy Structure 
We turn next to the explanation of the internal energy structure of the nucleus provided 
by the shell model.  Again, this explanation is rather simple, and quite obviously processual:  the 
energy structure of the nucleus is the result of the interaction of single nucleons with the 
aggregate potential created by the remainder of the nuclear system.  This interaction can be 
further divided into an electromagnetic, chromodynamic, and spin interaction.  Thus, the 
available energies of a nucleon in the nucleus are defined by these three interactions that nucleon 
can have with the nuclear potential.  It should come as no surprise, at this point, that the bound 
state energies that these interactions produce are the result of balancing these three interactions. 
I.e., the relative strengths of the three interactions define a series of stable states in which the 
three interactions are balanced.  There being multiple ways to balance these interactions, there 
are correspondingly many ways in which the nucleon can occupy a stable energy level.  
Again, it is far more interesting to see how and why this energy structure appears as a 
feature of the nucleus in the first place.  As already noted, the shell model of the nucleus is 
motivated by a qualitative analysis of patterns of naturally occurring stable isotopes, their 
spectral line signatures, and the decay of non-magic number isotopes into magic number 
 
isotopes.  Quantitatively, the stability of magic-number nuclei is the result of a difference 
between the binding energies of isotopes with a magic number of nucleons and nuclei with one 
additional proton or neutron.  
This energy difference manifests in various observed decay and spectral emission 
processes.  Lighter nuclei with one more nucleon than a magic number tend to decay through 
nucleon emission and alpha decay (Mayer and Jensen 1955, 21).  For example, Helium-5 and 
Lithium-5 will both α-decay into an α-particle and the additional neutron or proton respectively. 
Heavier nuclei will instead tend to β-decay into more stable isotopes.  
Mathematically, we represent these decay and spectral emission processes as the result of 
changes in the energy of individual nucleons.  These changes are in turn represented by jumps 
between energy levels defined by the interaction of the nucleon with the chromo-electrodynamic 
potential created by the rest of the nuclear system.  I.e., nucleons jump between energy levels 
quantized according to figure 3 above.  
This means that the energy structure is apparently playing an explanatory role in our 
explanations of decay and spectral emission processes.  However, just as with the shape of the 
nucleus, the energy structure of the nuclear system is only acting as a means of identifying the 
relevant processes in the system.  Recall that the goal of the shell model is to explain decay and 
spectral emission processes.  It was for this reason that we constructed energy states.  We first 
intervene on the nuclear system by, e.g., bombarding it with light.  This produces a change in the 
system, namely the emission of line spectra.  We then infer that our intervention must have 
produced, through a series of dynamics within the system, this emission of line spectra.  We infer 
that it is single nucleons that are excited by this light, and which, in losing this excitation energy, 
 
emit the line spectra we observe.  We know from the frequencies of the line spectra the energy of 
each emission, and therefore the energy of each energy excitation in a single nucleon.  We 
therefore ​construct​ a collection of energy states that can exhibit these energy excitations, i.e., by 
ensuring that the energy of each possible excitation is equal to the difference in energy between 
two energy states.  Importantly, we ​choose​ the mathematical potential in which we define these 
energy states.  While we know the interactions that define this potential (chromodynamic, 
electromagnetic, and spin interactions), we do not know their relative strengths or balance within 
the nuclear system.  This is something we must do entirely based on fitting our model to the 
observed energies of spectral emission (and decay).  
In short, the energy structure is superfluous to our explanations of decay and spectral 
emission.  Our interest is only in the balance of interactions between nucleons, and the 
interaction of, e.g., radiation with this balance that produces the absorption, excitation, and 
spectral emission processes we observe.  I.e., not only do we define the energy structure of the 
nuclear system in terms of three interactions and their balance, we only ever make use of this 
energy structure in our explanations as a pragmatic means of identifying the relevant and 
explanatory processes.  
 
[3.1.3]:  Robust Processes in Formal Feature Explanations 
Manifestly, both the liquid drop and shell models of the nucleus contain reference to 
exactly the same processes:  chromodynamic interaction, an attractive force, and electromagnetic 
interaction, a repulsive force.  Thus, manifestly, these two interactions are robust features of the 
 
models.  If we only reify these two interactions, i.e., the processes in each model, the models will 
not be contradictory.  
Each model constructs its token, explanatory processes out of these basic interactions. 
For example, in the liquid drop model, the difference between surface and volume 
chromodynamic interactions is the result of the difference in number of nearest-neighbor 
chromodynamic interactions that take place at the surface and within the volume of the system. 
This difference gives rise to two sorts of aggregate interaction, the surface-attractive interaction 
and the volume-attractive interaction.  Similarly, the field interactions for individual nucleons 
within the shell model are the result of aggregating all of the chromodynamic and 
electromagnetic interactions of the other nucleons with the one in which we are interested.  
Nevertheless, one might still be troubled that the two models disagree on empirical 
results.  Even if they both refer to the same processes, they cannot both be correct in every 
empirical context.  My contention, and what I show below, is that the difference between the 
models rests on their emphasis on how many and which processes to consider relevant, and 
which ones can be neglected in specific empirical instances.  Neither model denies or contradicts 
the existence of the neglected processes.  Quite the opposite: both models include explicit 
reference to the processes they are neglecting.  However, both neglect certain processes precisely 
because they are not always relevant to the behavior being explained by the model.  This being 
the case, I show here that the models do indeed become fully compatible precisely because 
neither is interested in being universally applicable.  
 
The key to understanding this is that the liquid drop and shell models do not posit 
processes in a vacuum, without context.   Rather, the processes of both models only exist insofar 18
as they are connected to specific interventions and dynamic alterations of the system.  Thus, the 
processes posited by each model, themselves not directly observable as is, e.g., the emission of 
spectral lines, are contextualized to these interventions and dynamic alterations.  
Let us consider again the shape of the nucleus.  My contention here is that the nucleus 
only has a shape insofar as we interact with the nucleus in a particular way.  In performing 
scattering experiments, we discover that there is a typical deflection pattern of our scattering 
probes.  In collecting this information through many scattering trials, we can summarize it by 
claiming that the nucleus has a contained charge density that is responsible for the scattering. 
I.e., the nucleus has a shape.  However, this shape is no more than a representation of the many 
individual deflections of scattering probes, the many interactions of the probe with the nuclear 
system.  These deflections, then, do not involve the processes of, e.g., spin interaction described 
by the shell model.  Instead, the interactions of the nucleons described by the liquid drop model 
are the processes that are relevant to the scattering and subsequent deflection processes.  
The processes of the liquid drop model therefore do not deny those of the shell model. 
Rather, the liquid drop model recognizes that those processes are not relevant to the processes 
that define, and in which we determine, the shape of the nucleus.  In the process of fission, and 
the processes of energy redistribution that make up the intermediate dynamics of fission, only 
nearest-neighbor interactions are relevant.  Interactions between distant nucleons still occur. 
However, they are of a size that is negligible in the redistribution of energy within the nucleus. 
18 ​See Jungerman (2003) for a brief discussion of the importance of interconnectedness both in physical models and 
process ontology.  Process philosophy, especially as advocated within Eastern philosophical circles  
 
This is because the redistribution of energy in the nucleus fundamentally relies on single 
nucleons translating their energy to others directly (hence the term “collision” in Bohr’s 
explanations).  In contrast, distant-nucleon interactions become highly relevant when considering 
the excitation processes of a single nucleon.  For this reason, the shell model includes these 
distant-nucleon interactions as important features.  Importantly, the shell model does not treat 
these distant-nucleon interactions as any different in strength or variety from the ones that the 
liquid drop model neglects.  They are the same processes in both models.  The difference is that 
the shell model considers them relevant parts of the dynamics of decay and spectral emission, 
whereas the liquid drop model recognizes them as small enough to neglect for the purposes of 
mathematical simplicity.   19
This, then, is how we explain the difference in empirical predictions between the two 
models.  The two models have different explanatory aims.  Namely, they are attempting to 
describe and explain (in terms of specific processes!) different dynamic phenomena.  This 
difference in aim translates into the incorporation of different processes as relevant aspects of the 
intermediate dynamics of the nuclear system.  Spectral emission, nuclear decay, and fission 
simply involve different sequences of dynamics, just as we learn about each through different 
interventions and different acts of observation.  Nevertheless, both models consider the nuclear 
system to be composed of electromagnetic and chromodynamic interactions, and of all the 
multifarious combinations of these basic interactions that one could reasonably construct.  Thus, 
19 ​Notice that as the number of nucleons increases, the importance of the asymmetry and pairing terms in the 
Weizsäcker equation becomes more important (see figure 2, the asymmetry energy).  Something similar happens 
with the shell-correction terms in this equation.  Thus, for larger nuclei, it becomes relevant to reincorporate the 
non-nearest-neighbor interactions into the model in order to explain nuclear shape.  This is a further indication that 
the liquid drop model is not contradicting the shell model in its process terms.  Far from it; the liquid drop model is 
affirming the dynamic ontology of the shell model.  
 
process realism about the liquid drop and shell models produces a consistent, monist, realist 
interpretation of the models.  
This is the explanatory defeat of things.  Notice that the formal features of table 2 are 
exactly those features of the nuclear system that the thing realist would expect us to explain 
using the liquid drop and shell models.  These explanations, as I have argued, are performed 
entirely in terms of processes:  it is the processes of chromodynamic and electromagnetic 
interaction that explain the shape of the nucleus and the internal energy structure of the nucleus. 
In contrast, the supposed material features of the nucleus are those entities the thing realist would 
have us reify in order to explain the formal features.  In short, the thing realist must argue that 
the explanations of formal features of the nucleus (and more importantly, the dynamics of fission 
and spectral emission and the like) require these material features in order to underlie the 
processes that are actually doing the explanatory work.  I.e., the thing realist must offer an 
underlier argument that processes require things ​ontologically​.   20
 
[3.2]:  Material Features of the Nucleus 
We turn now to material features of the nucleus:  the composition of the nucleus in terms 
of nucleons.  Prima facie, the liquid drop and shell models of the nucleus agree on these features. 
Both models, after all, refer to nucleons in their explanations of nuclear behaviors.  So, prima 
facie, the thing realist seems to have an available interpretational move:  the nucleus is a system 
composed of smaller things.  While the formal features of the nucleus are (collections of) 
processes, are explained by processes, and are used in the models to explain processes, the 
20 ​See Penn (“Processes Underlie Processes” manuscript) for a categorization of such arguments.  The first explicit 
underlier argument was probably offered by Aristotle in ​Physics​ ​1.2, 184b15–16. 
 
nucleons may yet act as some sort of thing-underlier for nuclear processes.  The contention is 
both an ontological and explanatory claim: 
(Ontic Underlier Claim):  Processes cannot exist without vehicles to undergo them.  For 
example, a nuclear interaction presupposes that there are two things interacting.  
(Explanatory Underlier Claim):  Processes cannot explain without things.  For example, 
any explanation involving a change in the nuclear system, like nuclear resonance 
oscillations, requires that there is a thing that changes in order to explain the 
change itself.  
There are three problems with this move, discussed in turn.  
 
[3.2.1]:  Nucleons Qua Things Do No Explanatory Work 
First we have already seen that it is the nuclear processes that are doing explanatory 
work.  Therefore, nucleons are only explanatory insofar as they participate in these processes:  it 
is only the dynamics of nucleons that are explanatory.   To suppose further that these dynamics 21
deserve their own explanations is legitimate.  However, it is illegitimate to suppose that these 
further explanations must involve things.  The nucleon, just like the nucleus, is an experimental 
system with features to be explained, in particular a set of dynamics to be explained.  Just like 
the explanations of nuclear features and behaviors above, we should suppose that the dynamics 
of nucleons, the behaviors of these nucleon systems, will be (and are in fact) explained by further 
processes, not things.   22
21 ​This point is made more thoroughly in Penn (“The Processes of the Candle Flame” manuscript).  
22 ​I will not discuss this further, since it is beyond the scope of this work.  However, notice that nucleon dynamics 
and formal properties were explained from the beginning in terms of exchange interactions.  This is the heart of 
Heisenberg’s 1932(a, b, c) work on the nucleus (see especially 1932a).  While Heisenberg’s theoretical framework 
was rejected, the idea of nucleons being fluctuations of oscillations in the energy of an exchange force was taken up 
 
 
[3.2.2]:  The Underliers of Nucleon Dynamics Are Processes, Not Things 
The thing realist must therefore rely on the ontological underlier claim.  This leads us to 
our second problem.  Specifically, any argument that is meant to support the existence of a 
thing-nucleon is equally an argument for the existence of a process-nucleon.  I.e., any argument 
that there is a thing, “the nucleon,” to underlie nuclear processes fails, or fails to rule out that this 
underlier is itself a process.  This failure is the result of a general failure of such arguments:  they 
rest on first recognizing that there is some stability in a system, and then claiming that this 
stability entails the existence of something static.  For more, see Penn (“Processes Underlie 
Processes” manuscript).  
In the particular case of the nucleon, we do not need any general failure of underlier 
arguments to see that the nucleon is itself a collection of further processes.  Nucleons are at best 
atypical things.  Our nuclear models, as well as models of these particles in field theory, already 
suggest that these supposed things do not possess characteristics like any thing we have 
discussed so far.  Nucleons are non-local, non-localizable entities.  They appear as fluctuations 
within an infinite field.  Mathematically, they appear as creation and annihilation operators, 
mathematical entities that are typically associated with actions performed on and activities of a 
system, not objects within the system. 
To see this, let us take the most basic feature of nucleons and see if they bear thing-realist 
interpretation.  That is, consider the simple and basic property that nucleons come in two forms: 
protons and neutrons.  These two things play quite similar roles in both the liquid drop and shell 
by Yukawa (1935)  in order to describe cosmic rays, and later reintegrated into the shell model of the nucleus. 
Moreover, the nucleons are now described field theoretically as the balanced and stable interaction of triplets of 
quarks, which are in turn described as fluctuations in the energy of a quark field.  
 
models of the nucleus.  Both engage in the same excitation processes, both engage in “collisions” 
that redistribute kinetic energy throughout the nucleus, both engage in collective motions as in 
fission, etc.  In light of this, one may argue that protons and neutrons are not differentiated by 
their behaviors (their dynamics, the processes they undergo).  Rather, one might suggest that the 
haeccity of protons and neutrons, or at least their “essential” properties of charge, mass, and spin, 
are the means by which we differentiate them.  I.e., the thing realist might argue that neutrons 
and protons undergo the same processes (spin, excitation, collision, etc.), and yet are different 
entities.  What differentiates them, then, must be non-processual.  Hence, protons and neutrons, 
in virtue of being identifiably different, are things, not processes.  
The point is well made, and is tempting.  However, we cannot accept this line. Protons 
and Neutrons do not undergo the same processes.  Undoubtedly, many of the processes we 
associate with neutrons in the nucleus are similar to those processes of protons.  However, we 
also always associate with protons an electromagnetic interaction of a strength on the order of 
the electron charge that we do not associate with neutrons.  The proton and the neutron undergo 
different internal chromodynamics—different quark interactions.  In turn, these quarks undergo 
different Higgs interactions with different relative strengths.  These different interaction 
strengths are used as the definition of the different quark masses, and by extension, the different 
masses of the proton and neutron.  Protons and Neutrons undergo different decay processes, even 
within larger-scale models of the nucleus like the shell model.  Neutrons can beta decay into a 
proton, an electron antineutrino, and an electron.  Protons, however, beta decay into a neutron, a 
positron, and an electron neutrino.  Protons and Neutrons are therefore defined both by different 
processes and similar processes of different strengths.  They are therefore differentiated, by 
 
definition, in mathematical description, and by experiment, through differences of dynamics, not 
by static properties.  
This leads us to our first counterclaim against the ontic underlier claim:  processes, not 
things, underlie processes.  For any nuclear processes for which the thing realist supposes that 
we should include a thing underlier, “the nucleon,” we need only replace the thing term with the 
relevant process underlier.  For example, the underlier of nucleon-nucleon interaction in the 
liquid drop model is the more-stable quark-quark interactions that define neutrons and protons. 
The underliers of beta decay processes of the nucleus in the shell model are the two different 
beta decay processes associated with independent neutrons and protons.  And so on.  Provided 
the processual underlier is more stable than the process it is meant to underlie, the processual 
underlier is perfectly capable of acting as an underlier.  Things are unnecessary.  
 
[3.2.3]:  Things Inherit Incompatibility 
However, the situation for thing-nucleons is far worse than simple impotence.  In fact, if 
nucleons are treated as things with thing-like properties, they will inevitably inherit all of the 
incompatibility of the models in which they appear.  This means that, even were we to suppose 
that the nucleus is composed of things (nucleons), we would still be left in the position in which 
we began our discussion:  with two sets of incompatible thing-components suited for successful 
explanations of physical phenomena in different contexts.  
To see how nucleons inherit incompatibility from nuclear models, we need look no 
further than the claims of energy structure within the nucleus.  The liquid drop model consists of 
no internal energy structure.  The shell model consists of rich internal energy structure.  Now, 
 
supposing that nucleons are things with static properties and relations to other things, we notice 
that nucleons in the shell model must bear relations to other nucleons that are not born by the 
nucleons of the liquid drop model.  In particular, shell-model-nucleons must bear the relations 
that compose the differences in energy of the various shells.  This means that the nucleons of the 
liquid drop model, which do not bear these relations, are incompatible with the nucleons of the 
shell model.  This same pattern can be demonstrated for properties like “being a surface 
nucleon,” “having a nuclear energy state,” and other monadic properties, in addition to relations.  
We might suppose that nucleons are not defined essentially in terms of these 
incompatible relations or monadic properties.  This at least removes the incompatibility. 
However, if nucleons are not meant to be the bearers of properties and the relata for nuclear 
relations, then surely they are utterly impotent even within thing realism.  Their only purpose is 
to satisfy some a priori assumption that the nucleus is composed of things.  Such an assumption 
could hardly prove particularly informative, useful, or persuasive.  
 
[3.3]:  Reestablishing Compatibility 
We can now collect what we have discussed into table 3, similar to table 1 showing the 
incompatibility of thing-interpretations of the liquid drop and shell models, to show that the 
models are compatible on a pure process ontology:  
Model —>  Liquid Drop Shell 
Explanandum of the model: Fission, Capturing, and 
Scattering Processes 
Excitation/Decay Processes 
Explanans offered by the 
model: 
Aggregate motions of the 
nucleons, brought about by 
the nearest-neighbor 
interactions of the nucleons. 
Interaction of a single 
nucleon with the field of 
aggregated interactions 
provided by all other 
 
Table 3​:  A collection of the processes that appear in both models.  These collections are 
identical, but are used in different ways to explain different ends.  
 
Moreover, we can demonstrate this compatibility by locating in both models the 
processes contained in the other.  As I have already discussed, the liquid drop model contains 
explicit reference to shell-interactions in the Weizsäcker mass-energy equation in the form of 
shell correction terms.  In the majority of cases, these correction terms are unnecessary to 
include.  Their effect on the binding energy of the nucleus, and therefore on the aggregate 
motions of the nucleus, is miniscule compared to the effect of nearest-neighbor interactions. 
However, for particularly large or small nuclei the shell correction terms become relevant.  For 
small nuclei, this is because the shell interactions are on the same length scale as the 
nearest-neighbor interactions.  Nearest-neighbor interactions are therefore significantly impacted 
by the small size and occupancy constraints on nucleons in their lower energy shells.  For larger 
nuclei, this is because the source of shell interactions—the aggregation of all nucleons save one 
into a single Fermi field—is strong enough to noticeably perturb the nearest neighbor 
interactions that guide fission and other aggregate motions.  Thus, while the liquid drop model 
has little to say about the form that these shell interactions take, the model still assumes that 
these interactions are occurring, and includes them as essential explanatory features when they 
become relevant to the modeler.  
nucleons (Shell Interactions) 








- Electromagnetic  
interactions 
 
The same can be said of the shell model and nearest-neighbor interactions.  The shell 
model is predicated on the fact that all nucleons in the nucleus are affecting the nucleon of 
interest.  The potential well formed by the sum of all of these interactions is what defines the 
decay and excitation processes for a given nucleon by defining the available energy levels for 
that nucleon, its shells.  As these interactions change, the experimenter making use of the shell 
model will need to alter the potential well in order to reflect these changes.  In other words, the 
potential well is fine-tuned to reflect the specific nucleon-nucleon interactions, both 
nearest-neighbor and other,  so that the experimenter may treat these individual interactions in 
aggregate.  
In essence, both models refer directly to the same processes—chromodynamic and 
electrodynamic interactions—in their construction.  Their difference lies in that they differently 
aggregate and select the processes that are relevant to their respective explanatory goals.  While 
the shell model does not explain fission, it was never designed to do so.  Since the shell model 
nowhere denies or contradicts the existence of those processes that ​do​ explain fission, we avoid 
the explanatory problem of the thing interpretation of nuclear models.  Similarly, these models 
are each fine-tuned in different ways by the experimenter in order to reflect the specific 
experimental situation for which they are being used.  The liquid drop model will never be 
fine-tuned to better reflect the spectral emissions of excited nucleons because it was never 
intended to explain these processes.  Again, nowhere does the liquid drop model deny or 
contradict the processes that are used in the shell model to model spectral emission and beta 
decay.  In short, nowhere do the ontologies of these two models differ.  Rather, it is because this 
 
single, processual ontology is used for two different scientific explanations that we have two 
different models.  
 
[4]:  Conclusion and Prospectus 
We have now seen, once more, that an apparent thing can be redescribed and explained in 
terms of processes.  In the case of the nucleus, as opposed to the cases of the molecule and the 
candle flame, we have also discovered that the supposed thing underliers of these defining and 
explaining processes are only things if one stretches the definition.  Protons, neutrons, and 
electrons are all dubiously things at all.  They are non-local and non-localizable, and they are all 
defined as fluctuations in an infinite field.  We therefore conclude that the nucleus is not a thing, 
but a collection of processes.  We also suspect that this collection of processes will have no 
thing-underliers.  
We saw a further benefit in the process realist account of the nucleus.  That is, the 
explanatory processes of the nuclear system are robust and non-contradictory across nuclear 
models.  This is in stark contrast to the thing interpretation of the nuclear models, which 
produced irredeemable contradictions between the models.  The thing interpretation of the liquid 
drop and shell models produced two different nuclei with different and incompatible structures, 
properties, and even haeccity.  In providing a non-contradictory interpretation of these models, 
the process realist once again goes beyond mere parity with thing realism.  I.e., process realism is 
once again shown to be superior in its account of scientific models.  
Finally, we must note that the key difference between process and thing ontologies, in the 
context of models of the nucleus at least, is that they characterize models as explaining 
 
fundamentally different sorts of features of the nuclear system.  The thing interpretation of the 
liquid drop and shell models characterized these models as offering explanations of static 
properties, structures, and thing-components:  the shape of the nucleus, the magic numbers, etc. 
This is evidently not the purpose of these models, both historically and in contemporary uses. 
The models are used to explain behaviors (i.e., processes) first.  Insofar as the nuclear system has 
certain behaviors that we ​describe​ in terms of these static properties—e.g., the way we use the 
shape of the nucleus to characterize the stages of oscillation within the processes of 
fission—these static properties are still useful tools.  However, they are not explanatory and must 
not be reified.  Only the behaviors of the system are of interest to those that use the model.  
The process interpretation reorients our analysis to describe these behaviors.  We 
interpret the liquid drop and shell models as tools to explain fission and excitation/decay 
processes, just as they were originally intended historically.  In so doing, the process 
interpretation also reorients our interpretation of these models to match the experimental use to 
which they are put.  These models are not meant to be descriptions of the static being of the 
world, but rather are constructed to describe, at their most basic level, specific experiments.  The 
liquid drop model is meant to describe fission, neutron scattering, and neutron capture in neutron 
bombardment experiments.  The shell model is meant to describe nucleon excitation and decay 
resulting in spectral emission and nuclear decay processes in decay and spectral line 
experiments.  Experiments are dynamic first and foremost.  The experimenter acts on the system, 
and observes some change in the system that results from the dynamic sequence their 
intervention triggers.  It is only natural, then, to expect that models meant to describe these 
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